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1. INTRODUCTION
Both abstention and participation rates are usually substantial in political
elections around the world. Moreover, they exhibit considerable variability
both within and across countries, well beyond what could be accounted for
by compulsory voting laws, voter registration rules, and other such regu-
lations.
1 Thus, explaining electoral participation is an interesting and im-
portant issue for political economy. At least since Palfrey and Rosenthal’s
[16] careful game-theoretic treatment of participation in large elections, it
has become increasingly clear that explaining electoral participation pat-
terns when voting is costly for individuals must somehow take into account
parties’ efforts in mobilizing voters or some other solution to the collective
action problem faced by like-minded groups of voters.
2
This paper develops a model of electoral participation where parties com-
pensate voters for showing up to the polls. In the model, parties target
accurately their favorable voters with lowest voting costs. The assump-
tion that parties invest resources in mobilizing voters is similar to a recent
contribution by Shachar and Nalebuff [17]. Our targeting model can also
be interpreted as a reduced-form version of a model with rule-utilitarian
voters. As shown by Feddersen and Sandroni [5], the equilibrium of an
election with ethically motivated voters (in the sense of rule-utilitarianism
borrowed from Harsanyi [7]) corresponds to a pure-strategy equilibrium of
a two-party game of the sort modeled in this paper.
We provide conditions for existence and uniqueness that rely on quasi-
concavity of the objective functions of the parties, as opposed to the con-
cavity conditions proposed by Feddersen and Sandroni. This allows us to
relax the assumptions of Feddersen and Sandroni with respect to the un-
certainty about the supporters of either party, at the expense of imposing
constraints on the distribution of voting costs. The advantages of relying on
quasi-concavity rather than concavity are illustrated by means of examples.
Existence and uniqueness considerations are not merely “technical” issues
in the context of voter mobilization models. Conditions for existence and
uniqueness impose severe restrictions on the functional forms that can be
used in these models, as illustrated by the examples.
We obtain that, in general, the minority party targets in equilibrium a
larger share of its favorable voters but obtains a smaller expected fraction
of votes. This is equivalent to the “underdog effect” that has been observed
in pivotal-voter models of turnout. Also, just as in pivotal-voter models of
turnout, and consistent with the evidence discussed by Blais [1], turnout
1See Blais [1] for a recent summary of empirical evidence about turnout.
2Dhillon and Peralta [3], Feddersen [4] and Merlo [14] summarize from different per-
spectives the political economy literature on turnout.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 2
increase with the importance of the election. Other comparative statics re-
sults depend on the assumptions about the distribution of voting costs. In
particular, with uniformly distributed costs, (i) neither an increase in the im-
portance of the election nor an increase in partisanship in favor of both par-
ties has any effect on the difference of expected votes as a share of turnout,
(ii) an increase in partisanship in favor of both parties results in an increase
in turnout, and (iii) if the majority party loses its partisanship advantage
then the difference in expected votes shares as a share of turnout decreases
and expected turnout increases. This last prediction, in particular, generates
the inverse relationship between turnout and election closeness that some
researchers believe to see in the data.
More generally, assumptions about the distribution of voting costs play a
key role in determining the sign of comparative static results. For instance,
variations in the importance of the election can also generate an inverse re-
lationship between turnout and election closeness for certain distributions
of voting costs different from the uniform. In terms of estimating empiri-
callymobilizationmodelsofturnout, assuminguniformlydistributedvoting
costs may eliminate interesting sources of correlation between observable
variables.
Besides the literature already mentioned, our paper is related to other re-
cent contributions. Morton [15] presents an early model of group behavior.
Coate and Conlin [2] estimate structurally a model with rule-utilitarian vot-
ers in a similar spirit to the model of Feddersen and Sandroni [5]. A model
of targeting is discussed by Herrera et al. [8] in the context of speciﬁc
functional forms. The emphasis there is in the effect on the policy posi-
tions of the parties of the anticipation of a targeting contest. Further aﬁeld,
Meirowitz [13] develops a model of electoral contests in which parties in-
crease their probability of winning the election by investing in “valence,”
which increases their attractiveness to supporters of either party.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
model of elections as targeting contests and develops existence and unique-
ness conditions. Section 3 illustrates the model and the existence condi-
tions with examples related to the previous literature. Section 4 is devoted
to comparative statics results. Section 5 contains concluding remarks. All
proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2. AN ELECTORAL CONTEST
Two parties, D and R compete in an election. There is a continuum of
voters. At the beginning of time, a random draw by nature determines the
fraction of voters favoring each party and the fraction of voters favoring
neither. The fraction of voters favoring party D and the fraction of votersELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 3
favoring party R are given, respectively, by the random variables ˜ d and ˜ r.
Let F be the distribution function of the random variable ˜ r/ ˜ d. We assume
that F is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable over (0,¥), with
limx→0F(x) = 0 and limx→¥F(x) = 1.
Each voter has a random cost of participating in the election, distributed
independently according to a distribution function H. We assume that H is
strictly increasing and continuously differentiable over some interval [0,c]
such that 0 < c, with H(0) = 0 and H(c) = 1.
Voters are willing to vote for the party they favor if the party compensates
them for their participation cost. Parties can target voters accurately; that is,
if a fraction xD of the voters favoring party D turns out to vote, the aggregate





where m(x) ≡ H−1(x)∩[0,c] tells us the participation cost of the marginal
type of voter who shows up to vote for D.
Parties D and R decide simultaneously the fraction of favorable voters
xD and xR, respectively, each party will be compensated for voting without
knowing the realization of the random variables ˜ d and ˜ r. We can imagine
party D committing to compensate any favorable voter with costs equal to
or lower than m(xD) for casting a vote, and similarly for party R. Let de
and re be the expected values of the random variables ˜ d and ˜ r, respectively.






Similarly, the expected aggregate cost for party R of attracting a fraction xR





The party with more votes wins the election. Thus, given xD and xR, the
probability of D winning the election is
P(xD,xR) ≡ Pr








F(xD/xR) if xD > 0 and xR > 0
0 if xD = 0 and xR > 0
1 if xD > 0 and xR = 0
.
For completeness, we assume P(0,0) = 1/2; that is, a tie occurs if turnout
is negligible, and the tie is broken randomly. The exact value of P(0,0) isELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 4
irrelevant, as it will become clear later. Note that P is continuous in xD if
xR > 0 and it is continuous in xR if xD > 0.
Each party obtains a payoff of G > 0 in case of winning the election and
of 0 in case of losing it. Thus, the expected utility of party D is
UD(xD,xR) ≡ GP(xD,xR)−CD(xD),
and the expected utility of party R is
UR(xD,xR) ≡ G(1−P(xD,xR))−CR(xR).
A targeting equilibrium is a pair (x∗
D,x∗








D,xR) for all xR ∈ [0,1].
Intuitively, we can expect that in equilibrium both parties have positive
turnout: if either party targets a negligible fraction of voters, the other party
can win the election for sure targeting an arbitrarily small (but positive)
fraction of voters, so that in fact it lacks a best response.3 Thus, we can
expect that in equilibrium each party either equates “marginal beneﬁt” and
the “marginal cost” of an increase in the fraction of favorable voters who

















R), with equality if x∗
R < 1.












R), with equality if x∗
R < 1. (1)
The intuition turns out to be correct under the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. For all c ∈ [0,c],
H0(c)c/H(c) ≤ 1.
Assumption 2. F0 es continuously differentiable. For all x ∈ (0,¥),
−3 < F00(x)x/F0(x) < 1.
3Of course, as noted by Hirshleifer [9], the same reasoning applies to to any contest
model where the probability of success is a function of the ratio of efforts invested by the
conﬂicting parties.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 5
Assumption 1 puts an upper bound on how fast the density of types can
increase as parties increase the “maximum price” they are willing to pay
for a vote. Equivalently, assumption 1 states that H(c)/c is nonincreasing.
Note that H(c) does not need to be concave. Graphically, assumption 1
means that the curve (c,H(c)) is “visible” from the origin, in the sense that
the straight line segment connecting (0,0) with any point in (c,H(c)) is
contained in the area {(c,y) : y ≤ H(c)}.
The upper bound in assumption 2 provides a constraint on how fast the
marginal probability of D winning the election can increase as party D in-
creases its willingness to pay. The lower bound, in turn, provides a con-
straint on how fast the marginal probability of R winning the election can
increase as party R increases its willingness to pay. Equivalently, assump-
tion 2 states that F0(x)/x is decreasing and F0(x)x2 is increasing. Graphi-
cally, assumption 2 means that the curve (x,F0(x)) is (strictly) visible from
the origin, and a similar condition with respect to the density of ˜ d/˜ r.
Assumptions 1 and 2 together guarantee that the expected utilities of
both parties are strictly quasiconcave. Thus, the “ﬁrst order conditions”
described by the system 1 are in fact necessary and sufﬁcient for an equi-
librium to exist.
We have
Theorem 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, there is a unique targeting equi-
librium. The equilibrium is given by the solution to the system 1.
The proof of this and other results is in the Appendix.
It is easy to check that CD(x) and CR(x) are strictly convex regardless of
whether assumption 1 holds or not. Thus, an alternative to assumptions 1
and 2 would be to require concavity of both F(x) and 1−F(1/x) (i.e. the
distribution functions of the random variables ˜ r/ ˜ d and ˜ d/˜ r) to ensure strict
concavity of both parties’ objective functions. Feddersen and Sandroni [5]
propose this assumption in a similar context. This assumption is more re-
strictive than assumption 2. To see this, note that concavity of F(x) implies
F00(x)x/F0(x) ≤ 0, which is stronger than the upper bound in assumption 2.
Similarly, from concavity of 1−F(1/x),
−2F0(1/x)/x3+F00(1/x)/x4 ≤ 0
for all x ∈ (0,¥). But taking y = 1/x this implies
2F0(y)y3+F00(y)y4 ≥ 0,
or equivalently, F00(y)y/F0(y) ≥ −2 for all y ∈ (0,¥), which is stronger
than the lower bound in assumption 2. Thus, as will be illustrated by meansELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 6
of examples, our assumptions are more permissive with respect to the un-
certainty about the supporters of either party, at the expense of imposing






From the previous discussion, we know that x∗
D and x∗
R are both positive.
The next assumption guarantees that x∗
D and x∗
R are smaller than one:
Assumption 3. Let x,x solve
xm(x) = min{re/de,1}c,
xm(x) = min{de/re,1}c.
Then for all x ∈ [x,1/x],
GF0(x)x < min{re,de}c.
Assumption 3 provides a lower bound to the marginal cost of getting
the most expensive voters to turn out in the election. Note that c = m(1).
Moreover, xm(x) is continuous, strictly increasing and goes from 0 to m(1)
as x goes from 0 to 1. Thus, x and x are well deﬁned. In addition, 0 < x ≤ 1
and 1≤1/x<¥. If de =re, we have x=x=1, so that assumption 3 simply
requires GF0(1) < dec.
We have
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the (unique) targeting equi-
librium is interior.
Conveniently, in an interior equilibrium the system 1 holds with equality.
3. EXAMPLES
3.1. Betauncertainty. Supposethatthefractionofvoterssupportingparty
D is a beta random variable with parameters a > 0 and b > 0, and that all
voters support either party D or party R. Then the density of the random




for d ∈ (0,1), where G is the gamma function and ˜ r = 1− ˜ d. The density of






for x ∈ (0,¥), known as Pearson type VI density or as beta density of the
second kind with parameters a and b (see e.g. Johnson et al. [10] p. 248).
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Thus, since x ∈ (0,¥),
−1−a < F00(x)x/F0(x) < b−1.
Assumption 2 is veriﬁed if and only if a ≤ 2 and b ≤ 2. For instance, if
˜ d is uniformly distributed on [0,1], it has a beta density with parameters
a = b = 1 so that 2 is veriﬁed.
It is easy to check that F(x) and 1−F(1/x) (that is, the distribution
functions of the random variables ˜ r/ ˜ d and ˜ d/˜ r) are both concave functions
if and only if a≤1 and b≤1. That is, assumption 2 is less demanding than
concavity of both ˜ r/ ˜ d and ˜ d/˜ r.
In a related model, Coate and Conlin [2] assume a beta distribution of
˜ d as in this example. They also assume a uniform distribution of voting
costs with support [0,c], which satisﬁes our assumption 1. Thus, a sufﬁcient
condition for the existence of a targeting equilibrium in Coate and Conlin’s
model is a ≤ 2 and b ≤ 2.4 With respect to assumption 3, suppose that












Finally, notethat, withbetauncertainty, F0(x)xisdecreasingforallx>b/a.
Since b ≤ a implies
p
























3.2. Dirichlet uncertainty. In the example above that there is only one
source of uncertainty, the fraction of voters supporting either party. This is
unlike the examples discussed by Feddersen and Sandroni [5], where there
isalsouncertaintyaboutthefractionofvoterswhoarenotwillingtosupport
either party (unethical voters in their framework). This example has some
of that ﬂavor.
4This condition implies that the second order conditions identiﬁed by Coate and Conlin
[2] (Proposition 2) are satisﬁed. We are ignoring here the assumption of their model that
parties may not be able to target voters with too high costs.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 8




for d,r ∈ (0,1), where a, b and g are positive. Here, 1−d −r represents
voters who favor neither party. As it follows from well-known results about
the Dirichlet distribution (see e.g. Kotz et al. [11]), the density of the






Thus, as in the previous example, assumption 2 is veriﬁed if a ≤ 2 and
b ≤ 2.
3.3. Quadratic aggregate costs. Although we take as primitive of our
model the distribution of voters’ costs of participating in the election and
derive from it the aggregate cost of parties, we can also interpret a given ag-
gregate cost as coming from some underlying distribution of voters’ costs.






for P = D,R, where h is a positive constant. It is easy to establish in our
framework
C0
P(xP)/pe = m(xP) = c for xP = H(c).
Thus, the cost function above can be generated by the distribution of voters’
costs H(c) = m−1(c) = c−h with support [c,c] = [h,1+h].
Of course, if CP(xP) is not strictly convex, we cannot reinterpret it as
coming from accurately targeting voters with increasing costs of participa-
tion. For instance, Shachar and Nalebuff [17] assume that the fraction of
favorable voters each party is able to attract to the polls is an exponential
function of some underlying effort variable, and that the cost of effort is
quadratic. But then the aggregate cost function is quadratic in the logarithm
of the fraction of favorable voters, which implies its second derivative is
negative for small values of the fraction of favorable voters. Thus, Shachar
and Nalebuff’s [17] model cannot be reinterpreted as a targeting contest.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
In what follows, we maintain the assumptions 1, 2 and 3, so that there is
a unique equilibrium and it is interior.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 9
4.1. The underdog effect and the upset probability. We say that party R
is the minority party and party D the majority party if de >re, and viceversa
if the inequality is reversed. It is simple to verify the following result:
Proposition 2. The minority party targets in equilibrium a larger share of
its favorable voters but obtains a smaller expected fraction of votes. If de =
re, both parties target in equilibrium the same share of favorable voters.
Thus, as in pivotal-voter models of turnout, in electoral contests there is
anunderdogeffect: supportersofaminoritypartyaremorelikelytoturnout
to vote (see e.g. Levine and Palfrey [12]). However, the fact that minority
voters are more likely to vote does not fully compensate for the fact that
there are fewer of them in terms of expected vote.
For “well-behaved” distributions of ˜ d and ˜ r, the party that expects to have
fewer votes will also be less likely to win the election. For instance, in the
context of the beta or the Dirichlet example, the probability of an upset (that
is, the minority party winning the election) is below 1/2 if a > 1 and b > 1.
To see this, suppose that R is the minority party. Recall that the probability
that R wins the election is 1−F(x∗
D/x∗
R). Using Corollary 2 we have
x∗
D/x∗















where we use the change of variables y = x/(1+x). Note that the last
expression is equal to a beta distribution function with parameters b and a
evaluated at its mean. Since b < a by the assumption that D is favored by
voters, this beta distribution is positively skewed. Since a > 1 and b > 1,
this implies that the mean is larger than the median, that is F(b/a) > 1/2
(Groeneveld and Meeden [6]). But this implies 1−F(x∗
D/x∗
R) < 1/2.
In the reminder of this section we explore the effect of changes in the un-
derlying parameters of the model on the expected turnout, the probability of
each party winning the election, and the expected closeness of the election.






The difference between expected votes for party D and expected votes for






















.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 10
From Corollary 2, if party D is the majority party, (dex∗
D)/(rex∗
R)>1. Thus,
both the probability of this party winning the election and the difference in
expected votes increase if the ratio x∗
D/x∗
R increases.
4.2. The importance of the election. We have
Proposition 3. If the payoff G of winning the election increases, then (i)
expected turnout increases, and (ii) the probability that the majority party
wins the election and the difference in expected votes as a share of turnout
decrease, remain constant, or increase, respectively, if H0(c)c/H(c) is in-
creasing, constant, or decreasing for all c.
Increasing the “prize” associated with the election leads both parties to
target a larger fraction of voters. If H0(c)c/H(c) is decreasing, the increase
is disproportionately larger for the majority party. This is because the mi-
nority party, which is targeting a larger fraction of voters, ﬁnds it more dif-
ﬁcult to target voters at the margin. Thus, the difference in expected votes
between the parties increases. This is the case, for instance, in the example
with quadratic aggregate costs.
If H0(c)c/H(c) is increasing, on the other hand, the increase in the frac-
tion of voters targeted is disproportionately larger for the minority party, so
that elections become closer in the sense of a smaller difference in expected
votes.
Finally, if H0(c)c/H(c) is constant for all c–or equivalently, if H(c) is
uniform–we get that the difference in expected votes as a percentage of
turnout remains constant, so that the effect of changes in G is to scale up or
down turnout for both parties.
4.3. Partisanship. We study here the effect of an increase in partisanship,
deﬁned as a proportional increase in the expected fraction of voters favor-
ing both parties that leaves the ratio re/de and the distribution of the random
variable ˜ r/ ˜ d unchanged. In terms of the Dirichlet example, this would hap-
pen if and only if g decreases but a and b remain constant. We have
Proposition 4. If partisanship increases, then (i) the fraction of favorable
voters targeted by party D and by party R (respectively xD and xR) de-
crease,(ii) the probability that the majority party wins the election and the
difference in expected votes as a share of turnout increase, remain con-
stant, or decrease, respectively, if H0(c)c/H(c) is increasing, constant, or
decreasing for all c, and (iii) turnout increases if H0(c)c/H(c) is constant
for all c.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 11
As in the previous subsection, the sign of the effect of an increase in
partisanship on election closeness is determined by the distribution of vot-
ers’ costs. In particular, with quadratic aggregate costs, elections with more
partisanship are more closely fought.
While an increase in partisanship leads both parties to target a smaller
fraction of favorable voters, the sign of its effect on turnout is not clear
except if H0(c)c/H(c) is constant. For instance, in Coate and Conlin’s [2]
model, an increase in partisanship will lead to an increase in turnout but will
have no effect on election closeness.
4.4. Losing the Advantage. Suppose in the initial situation party D is the
majority party, and it loses its advantage in the sense that re is increased un-
til it becomes equal to de. From Proposition 2, we have that (dexD)/(rexR)
is larger than one in the initial situation and equal to one in the ﬁnal situa-
tion; that is, the election becomes closer in terms of expected vote shares.
Moreover, xD/xR is smaller than one in the initial situation and equal to one
in the ﬁnal situation; that is, party D increases its effort in relative terms.
Manipulating the interior equilibrium conditions as in the proof of Propo-
sition 3, we get that party D must also increase its effort in absolute terms.
What is the effect on turnout? Using the expression above for expected
turnout, we get that expected turnout increases with a marginal increase in
re if
¶xD > −¶xRre/de.
Again, manipulating the interior equilibrium conditions as in the proof of
Proposition 3 we get that m(xD)xR must increase in going from the initial to





The numerator in the rightmost fraction is larger than or equal to one on
account of Proposition 2. The denominator is larger than or equal to one
on account of assumption 1. In particular, if H0(c)c/H(c) is constant for all
c–or equivalently, if H(c) is uniform–we get that the denominator is exactly
equal to one. Thus, with uniformly distributed costs, if the majority party
loses its advantage the result is an increase in turnout and a reduction in the
expected difference in vote shares.
4.5. Targeting accuracy. We have assumed that parties target accurately
the voters with lowest costs. More generally, we can think of the marginal
cost of the fraction of favorable voters attracted to the polls, m(xP), as being
decreasing in the accuracy of targeting. Immediately from system 1, the
analysis of an increase in targeting accuracy is similar to that of an increase
in the importance of the election.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 12
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a model of electoral participation built on three ideas:
First, voting is costly for individual voters. Second, parties composed of
like-minded voters solve the collective action problem raised by costly vot-
ingbycompensatingvoterswhoshowuptothepolls. Third, partiesmanage
to do so efﬁciently; that is, they compensate voters with the lowest costs.
Of course, in reality, parties do not hand out cash to their supporters in
exchange for voting, or at least this does not happen too frequently in es-
tablished democracies. But parties do reduce the cost of voting by handing
informationtosupporters, byhelpingwithregistration, etc. Theyalsoinvest
in the attractiveness of the act of voting for their candidates by publicizing
personal characteristics of those candidates that may not be relevant for the
ofﬁce contested in the election but make voters feel better about voting for
the candidate, not unlike the effect of endorsements in the publicity of con-
sumer goods. While efﬁcient targeting is a strong assumption, we believe it
is a useful benchmark for a voter mobilization model of elections.
Modeling elections as targeting contests implies that the cost for parties
of mobilizing voters is convex in the fraction of supporters attracted to the
polls, at least under the assumption of efﬁcient targeting. Existence of equi-
librium imposes some additional constraints on the distribution of voting
costs and the uncertainty regarding partisan support for either party, guar-
anteeing the quasi-concavity of the objective functions of both parties.
In terms of comparative statics, the model can replicate the correlation
between turnout and closeness of election observed by many researchers
(see e.g. Blais [1] p. 59). How the correlation may arise depends on the
assumptions about the distribution of voting costs. If voting costs are uni-
formly distributed, the reason for the observed correlation may be variations
in the difference between the support of the majority party and the support
of the minority party. For certain other distributions, the reason may simply
be variations in the importance of the election as perceived by the parties.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 13
APPENDIX
Theorem 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, there is a unique targeting equi-
librium. The equilibrium is given by the solution to the system 1.
Proof. A difﬁculty we face in the proof of existence is that the payoff func-
tions UD(xD,xR) and UR(xD,xR) are discontinuous near (0,0). To deal with
this, we perturb slightly these functions as in Feddersen and Sandroni’s [5]
existence proof. Let yD ≡ (1−e)xD +e and yR ≡ (1−e)xR +e for some
0 < e < 1, and let
Ue
D(xD,xR) ≡UD(yD,yR) and Ue
R(xD,xR) ≡UR(yD,yR).
Note that under assumptions 1 and 2, the functions Ue
D and Ue
R are twice
continuously differentiable. In particular, the ﬁrst derivatives with respect







































































We claim that if for some pair xD,xR we have Ue
D1(xD,xR) ≤ 0, then we
also have Ue
D11(xD,xR) < 0. (This implies that Ue
D is strictly quasiconcave



















































The ﬁrst term in the RHS is negative on account of the upper bound in
assumption 2, while the second term is negative on account of 1 and the
identity yD = H(m(yD)).
Similarly, we claim thatUe
R2(xD,xR) ≤ 0 impliesUe
R22(xD,xR) < 0. (That
is,Ue






















































The ﬁrst term in the RHS is negative on account of the lower bound in as-
sumption 2, while the second term is non-positive on account of assumption
1 and the identity yR = H(m(yR)).
On account of strict quasiconcavity, for any given xR, the functionUe
D has
a unique maximizing choice of xD or best-response, say BD(xR). Similarly,
for any given xD, the function Ue
R has a unique maximizing choice of xR or
best-response, say BR(xD). On account of quasiconcavity and differentia-
bility of Ue
D and Ue
R, best-response functions are continuous. Since xD and
xR are elements of a compact set, it follows from Brouwer’s ﬁxed point the-















D,xR) for all xR ∈ [0,1].
Next, consider any converging subsequence of equilibria of perturbed
contests (xe
D,xe
R) as e goes to zero. Let (x0
D,x0
R) be the limit point of that
sequence.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 15
We claim that x0
D and x0
R are positive. To see this, suppose x0
D = 0 and
x0
R > 0. Then for small enough e we must have xe
D < 1 and xe




R) ≤ 0 and Ue
R2(xe
D,xe
































Suppose, ﬁnally, that x0
D =x0
R =0. Then for small enough e we must have
xe








Having established that x0
D and x0





For the proof of uniqueness, suppose that (x∗
D,x∗
R) is an equilibrium such
that x∗
D < 1 and x∗
R < 1. We claim ﬁrst that there is no other equilibrium
ˆ xD, ˆ xR such that ˆ xD ≤ x∗
D and ˆ xR ≥ x∗







deˆ xDm(ˆ xD) ≥ reˆ xRm(ˆ xR).
But this is impossible since xm(x) is strictly increasing, which implies
dex∗
Dm(x∗
D) ≥ deˆ xDm(ˆ xD)
and
reˆ xRm(ˆ xR) ≥ rex∗
Rm(x∗
R),
with at least one of the two last inequalities being strict.
Next, we claim that there is no other equilibrium (ˆ xD, ˆ xR) such that ˆ xD ≥
x∗
D and ˆ xR ≤ x∗
R. The proof is analogous to the previous claim.
Third, we claim that there is no other equilibrium (ˆ xD, ˆ xR) such that ˆ xD ≥
x∗
D and ˆ xR ≥ x∗
R. To see this, suppose that ˆ xD/ˆ xR > x∗
D/x∗











GF0(ˆ xD/ˆ xR)(ˆ xR/ˆ xD) ≥ de(m(ˆ xD)/ˆ xD)ˆ x2
R.
On account of the upper bound in assumption 2, F0(x)/x is strictly decreas-







D) > GF0(ˆ xD/ˆ xR)(ˆ xR/ˆ xD).ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 16
However, on account of assumption 1, m(x)/x is non decreasing. (To verify
this, simply write m(x)/x = m(x)/H(m(x)).) This and x∗




R ≤ de(m(ˆ xD)/ˆ xD)ˆ x2
R,
which leads to a contradiction. Next, suppose ˆ xD > x∗
D and ˆ xR > x∗
R and
ˆ xD/ˆ xR = x∗
D/x∗
R. A similar argument leads to a contradiction. Finally, sup-
pose that ˆ xD/ˆ xR < x∗
D/x∗










GF0(ˆ xD/ˆ xR)(ˆ xD/ˆ xR)3 ≥ re(m(ˆ xR)/ˆ xR)ˆ x2
D.
On account of the lower bound in assumption 2, F0(x)x3 is strictly increas-







R)3 > GF0(ˆ xD/ˆ xR)(ˆ xD/ˆ xR)3.
However, m(x)/x is non decreasing. This and x∗




D ≤ re(m(ˆ xR)/ˆ xR)ˆ x2
D,
which leads to a contradiction.
An analogous argument shows that there is no other equilibrium (ˆ xD, ˆ xR)
such that ˆ xD ≤ x∗
D and ˆ xR ≤ x∗
R. Thus, if there is an interior targeting equi-
librium, it is the unique equilibrium.
Now, suppose that (x∗
D,x∗
R) is an equilibrium such that x∗
D <1 and x∗
R =1.
We claim that there is no other equilibrium (ˆ xD, ˆ xR) such that ˆ xD = 1 and







reˆ xRm(ˆ xR) ≥ deˆ xDm(ˆ xD).
But this is impossible since xm(x) is strictly increasing, which implies






R) > reˆ xRm(ˆ xR).
Similarly, we claim that if (x∗
D,x
)
R∗ is an equilibrium such that x∗
D <1 and
x∗









However, F0(x)/x is strictly decreasing while m(x)/x is non decreasing.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 17
Finally, suppose that (x∗
D,x∗
R) is an equilibrium such that x∗
D =1 and x∗
R <









However, on account of the lower bound in assumption 2, F0(1/x)/x3 is
strictly decreasing while m(x)/x is non decreasing.
(From the previously considered cases, it follows that if (1,1) is an equi-
librium, there are no other equilibria.) 
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the (unique) targeting equi-
librium is interior.
Proof. From Theorem 1, we know that under assumptions 1 and 2 the equi-
librium is unique and satisﬁes system 1.
Suppose that (1,1) is an equilibrium. Then, from system 1, we get
GF0(1) ≥ dec,
which violates assumption 3, since x ≤ 1 ≤ 1/x.
Suppose that (x∗
D,x∗
R) is an equilibrium such that x∗
D = 1 and x∗
R < 1.
Then, from system 1, we get
GF0(1/x∗
R)(1/x∗










R ≥ x, or equivalently, 1/x∗
R ≤ 1/x. But then the equilibrium condi-
tion GF0(1/x∗
R)(1/x∗
R) ≥ dec violates assumption 3.
The remaining case is analogous. 
Proposition 2. The minority party targets in equilibrium a larger share of
its favorable voters but obtains a smaller expected fraction of votes.







de R re ⇐⇒ x∗
R R x∗
D.




D) and m is a strictly increasing
function,
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Proposition 3. If the payoff G of winning the election increases, then (i)
expected turnout increases, and (ii) the probability that the party favored
by voters wins the election and the difference in expected votes decrease,
increase or remain constant, respectively, if H0(c)c/H(c) is decreasing, in-
creasing or constant for all c.
Proof. Let G1 be the initial value of the payoff of winning the election, and










































R. Recall that F0(x)/x is strictly decreasing under
assumption 2 and m(x)/x is strictly increasing under assumption 1. Thus,
the left-hand side of equation 2 increases in going from t = 1 to t = 2, but





Recall that F0(x)x3 is strictly increasing under assumption 2. Thus, the
left-hand side of equation 3 increases in going from t = 1 to t = 2, but the
right-hand side decreases. By simple inspection of equation 2, (b) is not




R. Using the formula for expected
turnout in the text we get that expected turnout increases.
Next, note that H0(c)c/H(c) = m(x)/(xm0(x)) for m(x) = c. Thus
¶(H0(c)c/H(c))/¶c R 0 for all c ⇐⇒ ¶(m0(x)x/m(x))/¶x Q 0 for all x.
In what remains of the proof, we assume that party D is favored by voters,











R). Consider a marginal increase
in G. Differentiating totally xD/xR, we get that xD/xR increases weakly if
and only if ¶xD/¶xR ≥ xD/xR. Differentiating totally m(xD)/m(xR), we get
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But since m0(x)x/m(x) is decreasing and xD < xR we get a contradiction.
Thus, an increase in G must lead to a reduction in xD/xR. An analogous
arguments shows that if H0(c)c/H(c) is decreasing, an increase in G must
lead to an increase in xD/xR, and if H0(c)c/H(c) is constant, the ratio xD/xR
must not change with changes in G. 
Proposition 4. If partisanship increases, then (i) the fraction of favorable
voters targeted by party D and by party R (respectively xD and xR) de-
crease,(ii) the probability that the party favored by voters wins the election
and the difference in expected votes increase, remain constant, or decrease,
respectively, if H0(c)c/H(c) is increasing, constant, or decreasing for all c,
and (iii) turnout increases if H0(c)c/H(c) is constant for all c.











































R. We claim that (c) is not







call that F0(x)/x is strictly decreasing under assumption 2 and m(x)/x is
strictly increasing under assumption 1. Thus, the left-hand side of equation
5 decreases in going from t = i to t = f, but the right-hand side increases.






R. Recall that F0(x)x3 is strictly
increasing under assumption 2. Thus, the left-hand side of equation 6 de-
creases in going from t = i to t = f, but the right-hand side increases. By







R. That is, the fraction of voters targeted by either party decreases.
This proves part (i) of the Lemma.
Next, recall from the previous proof that
¶(H0(c)c/H(c))/¶c R 0 for all c ⇐⇒ ¶(m0(x)x/m(x))/¶x Q 0 for all x.ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 20
In what remains of the proof, we assume that party D is favored by voters,















R). Consider a marginal increase
in partisanship. Differentiating totally xD/xR, and using ¶xD < 0 and ¶xR <
0, we get that xD/xR decreases weakly if and only if ¶xD/¶xR ≥ xD/xR.
Differentiating totally m(xD)/m(xR), we get that m(xD)/m(xR) increases

















But since m0(x)x/m(x) is decreasing and xD < xR we get a contradiction.
Thus, an increase in partisanship must lead to an increase in xD/xR and
therefore in (dexD)/(rexR). Analogous arguments hold if H0(c)c/H(c) is
decreasing or constant. This proves part (ii) of the Lemma.




















fort =i, f. From parts (i) and (ii) of the Lemma, if H0(c)c/H(c) is constant
and partisanship increases, xD and xR decrease but xD/xR remains constant.
Thus, from the two equations above we get that dexD and rexR must in-
crease. ELECTIONS AS TARGETING CONTESTS 21
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